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REGULATING THE NEW PRIVATEERS:
PRIVATE MILITARY SERVICE
CONTRACTING AND THE MODERN
MARQUE AND REPRISAL CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1994, the defense minister of the young nation of
Croatia appealed to the United States military for assistance. In a
letter to the Pentagon, Gojko Susak wrote that Croatia's goal was the
transition of the Croatian military "to one which follows the model of
the United States."1 Croatia's fledgling army had received stinging
defeats at the hands of Serbian forces in 1991 and Bosnian Muslim
forces in 1993, and enemy troops occupied over thirty percent of
Croatia's territory.2 Pentagon officials were sympathetic to Mr. Su-
sak's appeal, primarily because they had begun to see Croatia as a
potential moderate ally in an unstable region.' But the hands of the
United States military establishment were tied-a United Nations
arms embargo barred the United States from providing any military
assistance to entities of the former Yugoslavia.! Pentagon officials
referred Mr. Susak to Military Professional Resources, Incorporated
(MPRI), an American company that specializes in supplying military
training and expertise to governments and other organizations
worldwide.5
Because the arms embargo also applied to private entities,
MPRI could not provide direct military planning or intelligence
services or advice on strategy and tactics to Croatia or any other
party in the former Yugoslavia. 6 MPRI could only provide instruc-
tion on such non-strategic subjects as leadership skills and the role of
1. Roger Cohen, U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia After Winking at Its Buildup,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1995, at Al.
2. See id. at A5.
3. See id.
4. See Res. 713, U.N. SCOR (1991); Cohen, supra note 1, at Al.
5. See Cohen, supra note 1, at A5.
6. See id.
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the military in an emerging democracy.! Nonetheless, the impact of
the resulting MPRI-Croatia contract was dramatic. Just months after
MPRI was hired to conduct leadership seminars for top Croatian
military officers, the Croatian army launched the stunningly success-
ful Operation Uluja or "Storm" against the Serb-held Krajina region
of Croatia." In a five-pronged offensive, the Croatian commanders
integrated air power, artillery, and rapid infantry movements to tar-
get the Serb command and control networks, sending much of the
Serb army into retreat.9 Military analysts agreed that the evidence of
American instruction in strategy and tactics was unmistakable. '
Whether MPRI violated the terms of the United Nations arms em-
bargo is a murky issue, but the results for the United States national
security apparatus were clearly positive: without the involvement of
a single American soldier or a single American dollar, the MPRI
project strengthened Croatia's military and bolstered the nation's
strategic position in the region.'
Recent dramatic reductions in federal budgets for national secu-
rity agencies, as well as sensitive political and diplomatic considera-
tions, have led the United States government to increasingly rely on
corporate enterprises like MPRI to perform military and quasi-
military functions abroad.1 2 These private military service contractors
employ thousands of retired American military officers and view
military activity as a purely commercial enterprise.'3 Federal law re-
quires these companies to register with the State Department and ob-
tain a license for each project, 4 but the government does not directly
employ them. Instead, the companies hire out their military exper-
tise to foreign governments and other entities for profit.'5
In many ways, private military service contractors are modern
day privateers. During the American Revolution, the Continental
Congress and individual colonial governments licensed private volun-
teer ship owners or privateers to attack and plunder British ships.'6
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Ken Silverstein, Privatizing War, THE NATION, July 28, 1997, at 11,11.
13. See id
14. See Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(b) (West
Supp. 1997).
15. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 12.
16. See C. Kevin Marshall, Putting Privateers in Their Place: The Applicabil-
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The licenses the privateers received were termed letters of marque
and reprisal. 7 In exchange for their services these commercial warri-
ors were allowed to keep any booty they captured. In a similar way,
companies like MPRI are solicited to undertake profit-making mili-
tary ventures that align with the national security interests of the
United States.
For policymakers, these new privateers provide many financial
and political advantages over the use of regular military troops. First,
in an era of tight defense budgets, the use of private contractors like
MPRI is inexpensive. 8 Like many large corporations, the United
States military cannot afford to warehouse legions of experts with
very narrow specialties that are seldom needed. For the American
government, soliciting retired officers to accept privately-financed
military contracts that further American interests is extremely cost-
effective.
Second, in international relations, the introduction of American
troops into a region is often untenable. Private military contractors
can behave as unofficial agents of American policy in a region where
official action is prohibited or undesirable. For example, when MPRI
first entered the Balkans, the American military was barred from the
region, and when American troops were invited to go in, they were
part of an ostensibly neutral NATO peacekeeping force.' 9 Under the
guise of a private commercial enterprise, MPRI could thus achieve
what would otherwise be impermissible American military objectives.
Finally, employing privateers allows politicians to sidestep sensi-
tive domestic political issues.20 To the American public, risking the
lives of American service persons is often unacceptable even where
key strategic concerns are at stake. If private contractors volunteer
to take those risks at no expense to the government, it is a win-win
situation from a political standpoint.
These very advantages, however, also make the new privateers
potentially dangerous to American national security interests. Al-
though they are cheap for the government, private financing allows
the new privateers to operate outside the ordinary military chain of
command. Critics charge that this independence encourages many
ity of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared Wars, 64 U. CHI. L. RV.
953, 954 (1997).
17. See id.
18. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 14.
19. See Chris Hedges, Bosnian Muslims Are Reported to Rearm Secretly, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 3, 1997, at Al.
20. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 14.
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private military service contractors to go beyond government sanc-
tioned conduct in search of higher profits." Such unauthorized action
in hot spots such as the Balkans and the Middle East has the poten-
tial to destroy the delicate diplomatic and military stability policy-
makers are trying to achieve. The privateers may also inadvertently
draw the United States into direct military involvement by provoking
attacks on American troops or allies who are in these countries per-
forming other functions2
The increasing use of private military service contractors may
also undermine public accountability of the American military and
other organs of national security.' The public is generally unaware
of this risky aspect of American military policy and therefore unable
to make informed decisions about the government's foreign policy.
Should the government be able to sidestep opposition to American
involvement in political hot spots by simply arranging for privateers
to be put in harm's way rather than American soldiers? Is this a
principled way to handle potential domestic or international opposi-
tion to American military policy?
This Comment argues that while the Marque and Reprisal
Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to regulate private
military service contractors, Congress has failed to adequately exer-
cise that power to ensure that these new privateers act in the best in-
terests of the United States. Part II observes that private military
service contracting may undermine American national security inter-
ests if it is not strictly regulated. Part III establishes that the Marque
and Reprisal Clause of the United States Constitution grants Con-
gress power to regulate private military service contracting. Part IV
traces Congress's attempts to exercise this power through the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). Finally, Part V concludes that Con-
gress should enact new legislation to better regulate these companies
and ensure that they perform their activities in a manner that is con-
sistent with the best interests of the American people.
21. See Cohen, supra note 1, at Al.
22. See William D. Hartung, Mercenaries, Inc.: How a U.S. Company Props
up the House of Saud, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1996, at 26.
23. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 17.
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II. PRIVATE MILITARY SERVICE CONTRACTORS MAY UNDERMINE
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
While private military service contractors will likely play an in-
creasingly important role in the government's military and national
security policy, they may also endanger American interests. Because
these companies are privately-financed, they operate beyond the or-
dinary military chain of command and may be difficult to control
once authorized. This independence has the potential to inadver-
tently draw the entire nation into war by provoking retaliation
against American troops or civilians. Two companies in particular
illustrate the need for strong regulation in this area.
A. MPRI
MPRI is perhaps the primary player in private military service
contracting. MPRI spokesman and former head of the Defense In-
telligence Agency, Ed Soyster, calls his company "the greatest corpo-
rate assemblage of military expertise in the world"-a claim backed
by 160 full-time employees and a database of over 2,000 retired gen-
erals, admirals, and other officers available for contract work.24
MPRI has been crucial to American strategic planning in the
Balkans. MPRI's Croatian contract-officially termed the "Democ-
racy Transition Assistance Program"-is one of several in the region
licensed by the State Department Office of Defense Trade Controls.'
Federal law requires companies who sell military goods or services
abroad to register with the Office of Defense Trade Controls and ob-
tain a license for each contract.2
In order to obtain a license for its initial Croatia contract, MPRI
had to make assurances that it would not undertake "direct military
planning or advice on strategy to the Croatian Army."' Such activi-
ties would violate the United Nations arms embargo. It appears,
however, that MPRI's assistance to the Croatians went well beyond
civics lessons and probably violated the embargo. During the initial
MPRI training mission, Croatia spent an estimated $1 billion to arm
24. Mark Thompson, Generals for Hire, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 34,34.
25. See Paul Harris, Privatizing War: Military Advising Is Growth Industry,
INsIGHT ON THE NEWS, Aug. 26, 1996, at 12, 13.
26. See Arms Export Control Act 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(b) (West Supp. 1997);
Department of State International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22
C.F.R_ § 124.1(a) (1997).
27. Cohen, supra note 1, at A5.
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itself with East-European weapons, and any claim that MPRI of-
fered no advice regarding the procurement or implementation of
these arms is not credible.
Western military analysts are convinced that the Croatians did
not conceive of Operation Storm in Krajina on their own. An
American officer assigned to United Nations forces in the region
noted that "the evidence of American instruction was unmistakable.
You don't just stumble on what the Croats have achieved."29 Or, as
another military observer put it, "[t]he Croatians did a good job of
coordinating armor, artillery and infantry. That's not something you
learn while being instructed about democratic values." 30 A Croatian
spokesman told the press that General Varimar Cervenko, the com-
mander of Croatian forces in the Krajina campaign, met with MPRI
representative, General Carl Vuono (ret.), several weeks before the
offensive and at least ten more times in the five days immediately be-
fore the offensive.3' MPRI spokesman Ed Soyster described the
Croatian project as "kind of frustrating. No military plans. No strat-
egy. '32 But he has also laughed off the suggestion that MPRI over-
stepped its mandate in Croatia: "They could have got [sic] the battle
plan just as well from Georgetown University as from MPRI. 3
Critics of MPRI have taken Operation Storm very seriously, alleging
that MPRI violated the United Nations arms embargo and the terms
of its State Department license with the tacit permission of Pentagon
officials?
Uneasiness regarding such violations goes beyond international
legal niceties. Despite initial Clinton Administration support for the
Croatian training program, some Pentagon and State Department
officials believe that by going beyond the terms of their contract,
MPRI has served its client to the detriment of American strategic in-
terests." MPRI has helped the Croatian army become the most pow-
erful force in the region-the same Croatian army that burned over
seventy percent of Serbian homes and executed dozens of elderly
Serbs during the Krajina assault, and the same army that must learn
to cooperate with a far inferior Bosnian Muslim military under the
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 14.
31. See id.
32. Cohen, supra note 1, at A5.
33. Harris, supra note 25, at 13.
34. See generally Cohen, supra note 1.
35. See id at AS.
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terms of the Dayton Peace Accords.36 A stable, strong, responsible
Croatian military is in the American strategic interest; an aggressive,
unstoppable, irresponsible Croatian military is not. MPRI trainers
may have helped the Croatian military become the latter, thereby up-
setting a delicate balance of power in the Balkans that American
policymakers are working to achieve. 7
By the time the Dayton Peace Accords brought a tense peace to
the Balkans in November of 1995, MPRI was lining up its next con-
tract.38 The agreement signed in Ohio called for a series of negotiated
arms reductions by Bosnian Serbs to achieve a balance of power be-
tween the Serbs and the Bosnian-Croat alliance forces that would
control the rest of Bosnia.39 From the beginning, however, the Clin-
ton Administration considered this plan an inadequate solution, be-
lieving that military parity could only be achieved by arming and
training the Bosnians." America's European allies opposed this ap-
proach, but allowed the United Nations arms embargo to lapse in
March of 1996, a few months after the peace accords were signed.4
Even before the embargo was lifted, the Pentagon had enlisted
MPRI to contract with the Bosnian government to train its troops.42
The Bosnian government, with the help of a coalition of Islamic na-
tions including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Brunei, paid
MPRI's $400 million fee.43 With this contract, MPRI became a key
component in a policy whereby the United States quietly supported
the Bosnian army buildup on the one hand, while it remained offi-
cially neutral and participated in the NATO peacekeeping mission on
the other.'
Unless it is strictly monitored, the MPRI Bosnian Army project
could indirectly endanger the lives of United States military person-
nel stationed in the Balkans. Since 1996, the Bosnian Muslim gov-
ernment has been complementing MPRI's training with a massive
arms buying spree.45 According to some experts, the combination of
36. See id
37. See id
38. See Harris, supra note 25, at 12.
39. See Thompson, supra note 34, at 34.
40. See id.
41. See id
42. See Harris, supra note 25, at 13.
43. See id
44. See id
45. See Hedges, supra note 19, at Al.
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new weapons and MPRI training has encouraged the Bosnian Mus-
lim military to plan a major offensive to retake territory lost during
the war. As one NATO commander observed in the fall of 1997,
"[t]he question no longer is if the Muslims will attack the Bosnian
Serbs, but when."'' Such an attack would imperil- thousands of
American troops and shatter the fragile peace that the United States
has worked so hard to foster.
Authorizing MPRI contracts in the Balkans provides several ad-
vantages for American policymakers. These low-profile privateers
help achieve American strategic goals while the American govern-
ment remains officially neutral. But the MPRI projects are fraught
with dangers for the United States because thousands of American
military personnel are still stationed in the region. Neutral treatment
of the previously warring factions is critical to the legitimacy of the
AmericanINATO peacekeeping mission.47 If the Bosnian Serbs per-
ceive excessive American support for the Bosnian Muslims or Croats,
they may choose to undermine the peace process or take military ac-
tion against the Bosnian Muslims or even their American "allies. 48
On the other hand, MPRI's American training and expertise may
embolden the Muslims and Croats to exact revenge for past Serbian
aggression. None of these scenarios would be good for American in-
terests.
B. Vinnell
The Vinnell Corporation began as a southern California con-
struction firm in 1931 and built a reputation on civilian projects in-
cluding portions of the Los Angeles freeway system, the Grand Cou-
lee Dam, and Dodger Stadium.49 The company's involvement with
military and intelligence work began at the end of World War II
when it contracted with the United States government to ship sup-
plies to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army in China and continued
with contracts to build military airfields in Pakistan, Japan, Taiwan,
Thailand, and South Vietnam throughout the 1950s and 1960s.'
During this period, Vinnell also established a close relationship
with operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Company
founder Albert Vinnell offered his staff's services to the agency and
46. Id.
47. See generally Harris, supra note 25.
48. See Hedges, supra note 19, at Al.
49. See Hartung, supra note 22, at 26.
50. See id.
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several CIA agents used employment with Vinnell as cover for op-
erations in Africa and the Middle East." In return, the CIA helped
Vinnell win construction contracts on oil fields in Libya and Iran.'2
The company became most directly involved in military and in-
telligence operations during the American war in Southeast Asia
from 1965-1975. At the height of the war, Vinnell had over 5,000
employees in Vietnam. 3 They were officially working on projects
such as repairing American military equipment and constructing mili-
tary bases and airfields, but United States military officers who over-
saw Vinnell's work at the time have revealed that Vinnell also ran
several secret intelligence programs. In 1975, one Pentagon official
described Vinnell as "our own little mercenary army in Vietnam....
[W]e used them to do things we either didn't have the manpower to
do ourselves, or because of legal problems."55
Continuing American military defeats in Vietnam from 1970 to
1974 brought the company to the brink of bankruptcy in January,
1975.56 The company was saved from ruin later that year when it
landed a $77 million contract to train the National Guard of Saudi
ArabiaY This contract has been repeatedly renewed and expanded
over the last twenty-two years and remains Vinnell's most profitable
venture.58 The most recent incarnation of this operation involves con-
tracting hundreds of employees in Saudi Arabia to work for the
Guard and Royal Air Force. 9 Although the Saudi royal family will
pay the $819 million price tag for this project, it is part of an ongoing
effort by the United States government to shore up a politically-
moderate regime and strategic ally in the Middle East.'
At various times, both the American press and lawmakers have
criticized Vinnell's operations in Saudi Arabia as an effort to protect
the country's autocratic rulers from the democratic aspirations of
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 27.
57. See id.
58. See Charles J. Hanley, Firm to Train Saudi Guard Has Ties with Washing-
ton Insiders, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (MEMPHIS), Mar. 23, 1997, at A22.
59. See id.
60. See Hartung, supra note 22, at 27.
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their own people.61 The Saudi National Guard has a chain of com-
mand independent of the Saudi Defense Ministry.62 The 75,000-
strong force can operate as a mobile complement to the tank-heavy
divisions of the Saudi army in wartime, but its primary mission is pro-
tecting the ruling royal family from peacetime internal political un-
rest.6 Many in Saudi Arabia view the Guard as a palace guard whose
main mission is to crack down on internal dissenters.' To suit this
purpose, the Guard still recruits mainly from the tribal desert interior
of Saudi Arabia where strict loyalty to the monarchy is the norm.65
Over the past twenty-two years, Vinnell employees have become
an integral part of the Guard. One American military officer who
monitors Vinnell's Guard activities observed in a recent interview
that "[i]t's a big mission. We have responsibilities and tasks in every
functional area there is to run an organization... everything from
management training to logistics to medical."6' But he made it clear
that Americans do not "run" the Guard.67
Some suspect, however, that Vinnell agents have at times gone
beyond mere training and consulting. In 1979, for example, Saudi re-
bels took over the Grand Mosque at Mecca and demanded that the
royal family relinquish power.' As the Guard prepared to storm the
mosque, United States military personnel and Vinnell employees
helped plan the attack.69 Finally, when the initial attack failed, there
were unconfirmed reports that Vinnell "trainers" were brought in to
provide "tactical support" for the final successful assault.0
Despite such suspected actions that go well beyond training, the
Defense Department sees great advantages in soliciting Vinnell to
perform tasks like training the Saudi Arabian National Guard that
the United States military would otherwise undertake. First and
foremost, the Vinnell operation costs the American government
nothing and facilitates a key strategic goal of stabilizing an important
ally in the politically sensitive Middle East region. Second, it also
performs the task with no direct risk to American service men and
61. See id
62. See id
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Md
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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women-a critical issue with political constituencies in an increas-
ingly isolationist America.! Finally, Vinnell's private corporate
"consultants" may be able to keep a lower profile within Saudi Ara-
bia than American military personnel.
Recent events in Saudi Arabia exhibit the dangers inherent in
the deployment of companies like Vinnell. On November 13, 1995, a
bomb exploded in one of the Guard's training facilities in Riyadh,
killing five Americans. 2 Two of the victims were American service
personnel and three were civilian contractors including a retired army
officer.73 Many experts on Saudi politics said the attack was specifi-
cally targeted at Vinnell's Guard training contract. As one analyst
put it,
I don't think it was an accident that it was that office that
got bombed. If you wanted to make a political statement
about the Saudi regime you'd single out the National
Guard, and if you wanted to make a statement about
American involvement, you'd pick the only American
contractor involved in training the guard: Vinnell.74
While the American military provides direct assistance to the main-
stream Saudi army, Vinnell contracts for Guard training 5 Authoriz-
ing Vinnell to train the Guard may be an effort to avoid the percep-
tion that the American military is propping up the royal family's
autocratic regime.76
As the bombing shows, however, dissident political groups in
Saudi Arabia are not fooled. They accurately view Vinnell and other
American military contractors as de facto American agents who are
in Saudi Arabia to implement American foreign policy. That policy
includes supporting the Saudi government's main organ for quelling
political dissent, the National Guard. American policymakers must
carefully consider whether it is wise to continue authorizing Vinnell's
contracts when Vinnell is seen as a mere proxy for the United States.
71. See id.
72. See Terry Atlas, Terrorist Blast Points to Saudis' Vulnerability, CH.
TRm., Nov. 14, 1995, at 1.
73. See id.
74. Hartung, supra note 22, at 26.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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C. Other Players
The work of MPRI and Vinnell in the Balkans and Middle East
is a small representative sample of a vast new privateering industry.
MPRI, Vinnell, and other companies such as Betac, DynCorp,
Ronco, and SAIC have undertaken what are termed "military train-
ing missions" in such far-flung regions as Sri Lanka, Angola,
78 Peru,79
Rwanda," Taiwan,8 and Sweden.2 The officials of these companies
are understandably tight-lipped, and the American press and public
seem to have little interest in these regions, creating a dearth of reli-
able information on the operations of many new privateers."
III. THE MARQUE AND REPRISAL CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION GRANTS CONGRESS POWER TO REGULATE PRIVATE
MILITARY SERVICE CONTRACTING
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall have Power To ... grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal."'" To modem readers, the language of this obscure clause is
arcane and unfamiliar. For the Framers of the Constitution, how-
ever, issuing letters of marque and reprisal was a common, well-
defined war-making practice.
Using two lines of analysis, this section argues that the Marque
and Reprisal Clause applies to authorizing modem private military
service contractors. First, the activities of modem private military
service contractors are analogous to eighteenth-century privateering.
Second, a structural analysis of the constitutional war powers reveals
that the underlying purpose of the Marque and Reprisal Clause was
77. See Paul Harris, Ghosts of Vietnam Haunt the 'Resplendent Land,'
INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Aug. 5, 1996, at 15 (MPRI has trained members of the Sri
Lankan Army).
78. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 15 (MPRI is negotiating to train gov-
ernment troops in Angola).
79. See id. at 16 (DynCorp of Virginia has been involved with Peruvian anti-
drug operations).
80. See id. at 17 (Ronco trains Rwandan troops in de-mining operations).
81. See Paul Harris, Have Guns Will Travel Corporate Mercenaries with
Links to Arms Sellers and the Pentagon Are Fulfilling U.S. Policy Aims by Proxy,
SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, May 5, 1996, at 15, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
SCOTSM File (MPRI has contracted to provide services to the Taiwanese armed
forces).
82. See id. (MPRI has contracted to provide services to the Swedish armed
services).
83. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 12.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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to prevent the executive from avoiding congressional oversight of
national military affairs by employing privately-financed military
forces.
A. Licensing Private Military Service Contractors Is Analogous to the
Eighteenth-Century Practice of Issuing Letters of Marque and Reprisal
Revolutionary War era privateering was a privately-financed,
commercial enterprise controlled by government solicitation and li-
censing.' The privateers' focus on commercial gain rendered them
useful only when profit motive was aligned with the national interest.
While government efforts to maintain this alignment were largely
successful, the privateers' loyalty to profits made them controversial
and periodically called into question their strategic value. Modem
private military service contracting exhibits these same characteristics
and is the functional equivalent of eighteenth-century privateering.
1. Revolutionary War era privateering
Throughout the revolution, individual colonies-particularly the
powerful mercantile colonies of New England-and the Continental
Congress solicited owners of armed merchant ships to become priva-
teers." A letter of marque and reprisal gave the privateer the right to
finance and outfit a ship, attack and capture enemy ships, and keep a
large percentage of any booty captured.' The letter also imposed
rules regarding the area patrolled, the type of ships attacked, the use
of force, and the humane treatment of captives."8 Letters of marque
and reprisal required the privateer to post a bond guaranteeing
compliance with the terms of the letter/license. Special prize courts
determined whether booty had been captured lawfully under those
terms. 9 If the restrictions were violated, the booty was forfeited back
to the rightful owner, and the bond was used to compensate for any
additional damages.9
Overall, the privateers' entrepreneurial spirit aligned nicely with
colonial strategic goals. For the cash-poor colonial governments,
85. See Marshall, supra note 16, at 958.
86. See id. at 959-60.
87. See id. at 973-74.
88. See id. at 961-62.
89. See id. at 974-77.
90. See id. at 962.
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employing privateers was cheap and effective.9' Severely outnum-
bered and outgunned, the colonists' only hope against the powerful
British army was to disrupt its supply routes from England and the
West Indies. As profit-driven military entrepreneurs, privateers were
ideal for this purpose. 2 British merchant and supply ships were at-
tractive privateering prey because they carried rare and expensive
goods. With this incentive, revolutionary privateers effectively har-
assed British shipping throughout the North Atlantic and beyond.
John Adams recognized the importance of privateers to the revolu-
tionary war effort and called the Massachusetts privateering law "one
of the most important documents of the Revolution.""
Despite its success in disrupting British trade, privateering was
controversial throughout the wary Many colonists argued that the
privateers' insatiable thirst for booty made warmaking a purely
commercial venture and corrupted the revolutionary movement.95
Others complained that many privateers became price-gouging profi-
teers when it came time to sell captured goods which were rationed
or in short supply.96
The privateers' independence and profit motive also periodically
called their strategic value into question. Privateering was a high-
risk, capital-intensive venture. Fortunes were made and lost on the
high seas, and the expense of outfitting an armed merchant ship was
immense. Privateering captains were understandably cautious and
rarely engaged enemy warships by choice. s "Clashing unnecessarily
with a British warship was both folly and bad business, since such
ships rarely carried the goods privateers sought."" Instead, priva-
teers preyed mostly on unarmed or lightly armed British merchant
ships and depended on speed and luck to avoid the powerful British
navy.'0 While this approach made good business sense, it also ren-
dered privateers almost completely useless for organized naval cam-
paigns.10'
91. See id.
92. See id. at 960.
93. Id.
94. See Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War
and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035, 1085-87 (1986).
95. See Marshall, supra note 16, at 967-68.
96. See id. at 968.
97. See id. at 972-74.
98. See id. at 968-69.
99. Id. at 968.
100. See id. at 968-70.
101. See id. at 969.
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In 1779, for example, the American navy organized over forty
ships to attack a British naval base on the Penobscot River in
Maine."8 About fifteen of the ships were privateers that Massachu-
setts had insured and impressed into service for the battle."8 General
Solomon Lovell, leader of the ground forces, was roundly defeated
largely because the promised naval support for his attack never ar-
rived.1" Although regular navy ships also performed badly at Penob-
scot, historians assign much of the blame for the defeat to the priva-
teers who, more concerned with protecting their ships than military
victory, urged the American naval commander to stall and then fled
when the British navy arrived in force."5 Incidents like Penobscot
discouraged the government from ever again relying on privateers for
coordinated operations because such campaigns offered little oppor-
tunity for profit and plunder.
Profit motive could also entice privateers to overstep the bounds
of their licenses." Although privateers generally obeyed the restric-
tions contained in their letters of marque and reprisal, rogue priva-
teers who attacked neutral ships created diplomatic crises and threat-
ened to draw the whole country into wider war with European
powers. '° Several incidents involving ships from Sweden and France
-both neutral countries at the time-brought threats of military ac-
tion against the colonies or naval retaliation against American ship-
ping.,03
There were, however, two important checks on privateering at-
tacks against neutral vessels. First, a privateer captured while attack-
ing a neutral ship or in waters outside the terms of his letter received
no diplomatic assistance from the United States government and suf-
fered his fate as an accused pirate alone. 9 This obviously served as
strong incentive for privateers to attack only British ships and to stay
within authorized shipping lanes. Second, the prize courts reviewed
every capture at sea after the fact. As businessmen, privateers were
102. See iL at 970.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 974-75.
107. See id.
108. See id. Two British ships were also returned to their owners under British
government protests that the capturing privateers had sailed from French ports
when a British-French treaty prohibited such action. See id.
109. See id.; see also John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other
Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167, 251
(1996).
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generally eager to gain legal title to their prizes through the courts
because enormous amounts of money were involved.1 Violation of
neutrality rules led to forfeiture of any prize and liability for damages
plus interest."' These mechanisms helped keep the revolutionary
privateers' profit motive aligned with the interests of the new Ameri-
can nation.
2. The new privateers
The defining characteristics of Revolutionary War privateering
are also present in the activities of modem companies like MPRI and
Vinnell-the new privateers. Modem private military service con-
tractors are solicited by the government to achieve American military
objectives and are subject to a government licensing scheme similar
to the issuance of marque and reprisal letters. American State and
Defense Department officials, for example, negotiated MPRI's con-
tract with the Bosnian government 12 and have brokered Vinnell's
continuing series of contracts with Saudi Arabia.1 Like the priva-
teers, private military service contractors must promise that their ac-
tions will remain within specified limits. For example, in order to ob-
tain a license for its Croatian project, MPRI had to give specific
assurances that its training activities would not violate the United
Nations Arms Embargo.'
Commercial gain is the focus of the new privateers just as it was
for their eighteenth-century counterparts. Vinnell records consis-
tently growing profits, and individual employees are well compen-
sated. Retired American service personnel report that five years of
work with Vinnell enables them to save hundreds of thousands of
dollars."5 As one former officer put it, Saudi oil money flows so
freely that employees feel "like they've died and gone to heaven, be-
cause the Saudis will never run out of money. 11 6 MPRI's motivation
is also entirely economic. It is no coincidence that the company's
biggest Balkan contract is with the Bosnian Muslims-a group
backed by the oil-rich Islamic regimes of the Middle East.'
110. See Marshall, supra note 16, at 975.
111. See id. at 976.
112. See Harris, supra note 25, at 12-13.
113. See Hartung, supra note 22, at 26.
114. See Cohen, supra note 1, at A5.
115. See Hartung, supra note 22, at 28.
116. Id.
117. See Harris, supra note 25, at 13.
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This focus on commercial gain has made the new privateers very
controversial. Some commentators argue that the private, low-
profile nature of their activities renders the new privateers improp-
erly unaccountable to the American political process.' Elected offi-
cials who should be responsible to the electorate for their policy de-
cisions may be tempted to solicit privateers in an effort to obfuscate
controversial policies."9 Overuse or abuse of private military forces
may make it impossible for the electorate to make informed decisions
regarding American national security policy.
The new privateers' focus on commercial gain also makes it criti-
cal that they are used only when a clear profit motive aligns directly
with American policy objectives. Like their eighteenth-century coun-
terparts, modem policymakers have generally been able to maintain
this alignment. In an era of shrinking defense budgets, private mili-
tary service contracting has cheaply and effectively achieved Ameri-
can policy goals in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere."
When the government fails to ensure the alignment of profit and
policy, however, a focus on servicing the customer may create incen-
tives for the new privateers to go beyond the terms of their licenses
much like the rogue privateers of old. Some analysts have argued
that "hired guns" like MPRI and Vinnell are inherently dangerous to
United States interests because they have divided loyalties. Al-
though it is solicited and licensed by the American government, a
private military service contractor's ultimate loyalty is to its cus-
tomer.12 1 If asked to go beyond its authorized activities, the privateer
may take a "the customer is always right" approach and subvert
American policy rather than disappoint a paying customer. In Croa-
tia, for example, American officials are now concerned that MPRI
may have gone beyond the terms of its license to violate the United
Nations arms embargo and upset the delicate balance of power in the
region.2i"
Thus, modem military service contracting exhibits the defining
characteristics of Revolutionary War privateering and requires simi-
lar government efforts to maintain an alignment between commercial
incentives and national security policy. As the next section shows,
118. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 11.
119. See id.
120. See generally Hartung, supra note 22; Hedges, supra note 19; Silverstein,
supra note 12.
121. See Thompson, supra note 34, at 36.
122. See Cohen, supra note 1, at A5.
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the Constitution requires that Congress be primarily responsible for
those efforts.
B. The Underlying Purpose of the Marque and Reprisal Clause Was
to Ensure Congressional Oversight of All National Military Ventures
In drafting provisions for war and national defense, a central
concern for the Framers of the Constitution was that the new, more
centralized government would lead to military despotism. In re-
sponse to this concern they created an integrated system of separated
war and national security powers. m Most importantly, they sepa-
rated power over the national sword from power over the national
purse-making the president the Commander-in-Chief of the mili-
tary,' but reserving to Congress sole power to approve spending
from the national treasury." Under this arrangement, congressional
approval or acquiescence for most accepted forms of military ac-
tion-deploying American troops, hiring mercenaries, or sending aid
to allied military forces-was constitutionally required. There was
one form of military action, however, that lay beyond the power of
the purse-the solicitation of privateers. The Marque and Reprisal
Clause closed this small but critical loophole in congressional power
over warmaking, assigning to Congress the power to license and
regulate privately-financed military ventures on behalf of the na-tion.'26
1. The Framers viewed the congressional purse power as a critical
check on presidential authority over national military policy
An analysis of the structure of the Constitution and the history
leading up to the American revolution demonstrates that a theory of
purse/sword separation lay at the heart of the war powers framework.
123. See Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 20-21 (1995).
124. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
125. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
126. Some scholars have argued that the Marque and Reprisal Clause applies
to all military activities short of full-scale, declared war, including open hostilities
employing United States military forces and covert operations employing hired
proxies. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 94, at 1040-41. This argument, however,
misapprehends the Clause's more narrow but crucial role in the war powers
framework. With sufficient political will, Congress can control any use of the
United States military or paid proxies through its purse power. For the Framers,
the term "letters of marque and reprisal" applied only to a specific type of pri-
vately-financed, commercial military enterprise that lay beyond Congress's
power of the purse.
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Article I of the Constitution grants Congress a long list of pow-
ers directly related to war and national defense. Congress has the
power to tax and spend for the common defense,23 declare 
war,128
grant letters of marque and reprisal,29 make rules for captures on
land and water,"8 raise and support armies,' provide and maintain a
navy,' 2 regulate the army and navy, '33 call the militia into service, m
regulate the militia,3' and determine when a state may engage in
war.
136
But, for the Framers, none of these provisions was more impor-
tant to the constitutional war powers scheme than the dictate of Ar-
ticle I, Section 9, Clause 7: "No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."'' 7
127. See id. § 8, cl. 1.
128. See id. § 8, ci. 11.
129. See id.
130. See id
131. See id. § 8, cl. 12.
132. See id § 8, cl. 13.
133. See id. § 8, cl. 14.
134. See id. § 8, cl. 15.
135. See id. § 8, cl. 16.
136. See id. § 10, cl. 3.
137. Id. § 9, cl. 7; see WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATION-
AL SECURrrY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 3 (1994). Some twentieth-
century scholars emphasize the Declare War Clause as Congress's most impor-
tant war power. See generally FISHER, supra note 123; Lobel, supra note 94.
They tend to view the prevalence of undeclared war as a modern development.
In fact, the Framers did not think that a formal declaration of war was needed to
initiate military hostilities. Alexander Hamilton specifically recognized that, by
the time of the founding, formal declarations of war had largely fallen into dis-
use, and other Framers echoed the view that formal declarations had become
"obsolete." See Yoo, supra note 109, at 248. It would have made little sense for
the Framers to rely on a largely formalistic or unused power to play a practical
role in assuring congressional authority over military affairs. See id.
Professor John C. Yoo argues that in the late eighteenth century, the power
to declare war did not describe the power to initiate military action. Instead, it
was precisely as the name implied, a declaratory power that announced a change
in legal relationships. Under international law, declaring war just before hostili-
ties or during hostilities already begun announced the new state of legal relations
existing between the countries involved. See id- at 244-45.
Domestically, a declaration of war was meant to signify a change in the con-
stitutional relationship between the government and the governed. See id. For
example, the Fifth Amendment guarantees indictment or grand jury presentment"except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in ac-
tual service in time of War or public danger." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Third
Amendment also guarantees that "[n]o soldier shall, in time of peace be quar-
tered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law." Id. amend. III. Thus, the Constitution recog-
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Madison called the power of the purse the "most compleat and effec-
tual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate rep-
resentatives of the people, for obtaining redress of every grievance,
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure."'38 Con-
gress's complete control of the governmental purse strings supports
each of its above listed war powers in two ways.' First, it gives Con-
gress the ex ante power to specify exactly how funds will be spent be-
fore they are drawn.'" And second, if these specifications are not
followed, the clause gives Congress the ex post or after the fact power
to cut off future funds and effectively end any ongoing program or
operation.1
41
The success of purse/sword separation was manifest to the
Framers via the British example. Originally, the British monarch
decided when and where the kingdom should go to war, but by the
late seventeenth century, Parliament was exercising effective veto
power over monarchical military adventurism through control of the
treasury.' 42 The king acted in close consultation with Parliament
during times of war and could not maintain a standing army without
parliamentary consent during peacetime. This aspect of British his-
tory was discussed extensively during the framing and ratification de-
bates. 43
The Framers' experience with colonial government also instilled
in them a strong belief in the effectiveness of the power of the
purse.'44 Colonial governments were modeled on the British system
with a governor as the executive, an appointed governor's council as
the upper legislative house, and an elected lower house.' 45 Through
this model, the British unwittingly sowed the seeds of revolution. In
an early effort to limit the power of the elected assemblies, the king
decreed that they could not exercise any power that the House of
nizes different boundaries for government power in times of war and peace and
assigps the quasi-judicial function of determining when the country is officially at
war to Congress.
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 380 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed.
1941).
139. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 137, at 3.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 11-17.
143. See id. at 11.
144. See id. at 22.
145. See id. at 18.
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Commons in England was not allowed to wield.4 ' Almost immedi-
ately, the assemblies began to assert a right to all powers analogous
to those exercised by the British lower house. The central power
claimed was the power of the purse. Later, the English crown re-
quired the colonies to fund their own defense during the French and
Indian War. By refusing to release defense funds to the governors
unless certain policy conditions were met, the colonists opportunisti-
cally exploited military emergencies to undermine executive author-
ity and assert more power for the elected representatives of the peo-
ple.'
The Framers also relied on their experience with purse/sword
separation under the Articles of Confederation when considering the
apportionment of war powers. The Articles granted Congress the
power to conduct the Revolutionary War but reserved to the states
all power to tax and spend. 48 This federal-state separation of powers
successfully gave the states a strong veto power over the conduct of
war because they controlled funding for the cause. Unfortunately,
this approach also made it virtually impossible for Congress to con-
duct the war at all.'49
During the ratification debates, the antifederalists continued to
oppose any taxing powers for the federal government, arguing that a
government that "has all power and both purse and Sword has the
absolute Gov't of all other Bodies and they must exist at the will and
pleasure of the Superior."' James Madison pointed to the separa-
tion of purse from sword within the federal government to counter
this argument:
Does it mean that the sword and purse ought not to be
trusted in the hands of the same government? This cannot
146. See id.
147. See id at 19-21.
148. See id. at 22-23.
149. See iL Many commentators argue that the Continental Congress's inef-
fective leadership during the Revolutionary War effort led the framers to vest
most military power in the executive through the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
See id. This is a misreading of the "lessons" the framers learned from the Revo-
lutionary War. The primary problem Congress faced in conducting the war was
their dependence for funding on the whim of the states. "The first lesson of the
Revolutionary War was therefore that effective war-making-and national de-
fense-required a reallocation of power between the national government and
the states,"-not a centralized allocation of power in the executive branch alone.
I& at 25-26.
150. JACKsON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, 1781-1788, at 144 (1961) (quoting Melancton Smith at the New
York ratifying convention).
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be the meaning; for there never was, and I can say there
never will be, an efficient government, in which both are not
vested. The only rational meaning is, that the sword and
purse are not to be given to the same member. Apply it to
the British government.... The sword is in the hands of the
British king; the purse in the hands of the Parliament. It is
so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.... The purse
is in the hands of the representatives of the people. They
have appropriation of all moneys."'
Thus, by using its "compleat and effectual weapon," Congress would
be able to defend its role in virtually every aspect of American mili-
tary policy.
Shared power over military affairs creates constant friction and a
need for cooperation between the political branches of govermnent. 15Z
While the president is the natural initiator of foreign and military
policy, the executive power is in no way greater than that of legisla-
ture. Congress, after all, has the power to raise or not raise armies;
to provide or not provide a navy; 54 to call or not call the militia into
service;" and to appropriate or not appropriate funds for these pur-
poses.'56 Even in the modem context of proxy armies and covert op-
erations, Congress plays an effective role in military and intelligence
policy when it requires detailed reports of such activities and reviews
their wisdom-all under a threat that if reporting requirements are
not complied with or use of such forces is not wise, Congress will cut
off their funding. In a system of separated powers, Congress main-
tains practical control over military policy primarily because it has
the power of the purse.
2. The Marque and Reprisal Clause closes a loophole in
congressional power over national military affairs-presidential
solicitation of privately-financed military forces
There was limited debate regarding the Marque and Reprisal
Clause during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, and
the Clause is often ignored in modem war powers debate." Both the
151. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 393 (J. Madison) (John Elliot ed. 1836).
152 See HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 69 (1990).
153. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
154. See id. § 8, cl. 13.
155. See id. § 8, ci. 15.
156. See id. § 9.
157. See Lobel, supra note 94, at 1036.
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historical record and structure of the Constitution however, prove
that the Marque and Reprisal Clause represented the Framers' view
that Congress should be involved in all areas of military policy.
James Madison noted that giving Congress the sole power to issue
marque and reprisal letters was designed to ensure "immediate re-
sponsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct that nation
itself is responsible."'58 If issuing a letter of marque and reprisal was
an act of war, then the nation as a whole would face the consequences
of that act, and the nation as a whole must approve it.'59
The Marque and Reprisal Clause ensured congressional control
of a common form of warmaking that was beyond the power of the
purse. Without the Clause, the president or the states could license
privately-financed, war-making ventures and commit the nation to
acts of war without any Congressional oversight before or after the
fact. The Framers drafted the Marque and Reprisal Clause to ensure
congressional control over the decision to employ privateers.
This underlying purpose for the Marque and Reprisal Clause
applies equally to the modem practice of soliciting private military
service contractors. Like the privateers, these privately-financed
commercial warriors are not beholden to the national treasury. The
Constitution, however, mandates congressional control over pri-
vately-financed military enterprises to ensure that the direct repre-
sentatives of the people have a voice in all military policy.
158. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 318 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
159. The importance of a centralized marque and reprisal power to the Fram-
ers is also exhibited in the apportionment of the marque and reprisal power be-
tween the state and federal governments. Article I, Section 10 delineates powers
that the states, through the Constitution, ceded to the federal government in all
circumstances: "No State shall ... grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, Cl. 1. That section goes on to list national powers that a state
could undertake with congressional approval:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ..., keep Troops, or
Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay. Id, § 10, cl. 3.
The different wording in these two clauses shows the importance the Framers at-
tached to the centralized deployment and regulation of privateers. With the con-
sent of Congress, states can raise armies and engage in full-scale war, but the first
clause prevents the states from ever issuing letters of marque and reprisal even
with congressional approval.
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IV. CONGRESS HAS ATTEMPTED TO REGULATE PRIVATE
MILITARY SERVICE CONTRACTING THROUGH THE ARMS EXPORT
CONTROL ACT (AECA)
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) regulates all foreign
sales of "defense goods and services" by the United States Govern-
ment and private contractors.W Companies like MPRI and Vinnell
provide defense services under that Act and are therefore subject to
its provisions. This section outlines the basic provisions of the Act
and discusses its constitutionality and effectiveness.
A. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA)
The laws and regulations Congress and the Department of State
have created to deal with the private military service industry are
part of a larger scheme to regulate the export of American defense
technology and services. The AECA... is the key statute in this area.
The statute authorizes the president "[i]n furtherance of world peace
and the security and foreign policy of the United States," to control
the import and export of arms and other defense articles and serv-
ices." 2 The Act gives the president full authority to promulgate
regulations for this purpose and to designate items as defense articles
and defense services by placing them on the United States Munitions
List. 63 Any person or organization that manufactures, exports, or
imports the goods or services on the list must register with the United
States government and receive a license for each contract."' Criminal
penalties can result from a failure to register properly.65 Congress
has given the president broad power to determine not only registra-
tion and licensing procedures but also which goods and services fall
under the regulations.
A major inter-branch limitation on this executive regulatory
power is a series of reporting and certification requirements. Basi-
cally, any license to export defense goods or services to a single na-
tion or organization totaling more than $1 million must be reported
to the Speaker of the House and the Chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on a quarterly basis.' " The report must include
160. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West Supp. 1997).
161. See id.
162. Id. § 2778(a)(1).
163. See id.
164. See id. § 2778(b).
165. See id. § 2778(c).
166. See id § 2776(a).
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necessitate the immediate issuance of the export license and a dis-
cussion of the national security interests involved."'7 4
The final check on presidential regulatory power in this area was
added in 1996. The new provision requires the president to publish
the above certifications in the Federal Register upon transmittal to
the Speaker of the House and Chair of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee.175 This public notification requirement only applies to major
arms licenses for export deals totaling $50 million or more6
B. The Arms Export Control Act is Constitutional Under Current
Supreme Court Doctrines
Because Congress has explicitly authorized the president to
regulate the new privateers through the AECA, the critical constitu-
tional issue in this area is whether Congress has in some way uncon-
stitutionally delegated its power to the executive branch.
Most constitutional scholars believe that, in the realm of foreign
affairs, Congress has a particularly broad ability to delegate authority
to the president.
Although the Constitution provides that in matters of
foreign relations the President and Congress share
concurrent power, the Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution's separation of powers and its arrangement of
checks and balances are less precise in this area than a
survey of the text might suggest. Consequently, the Court
has permitted Congress to make broad delegations of its
foreign policy powers to the Executive Branch at times
when it might not have permitted similarly expansive
delegations with regard to domestic affairs."n
The main source for this permissive delegation doctrine is Justice
Sutherland's opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.78
The case concerned a joint resolution that permitted the president to
control the export of arms to a region in South America if, in his
opinion, the export would prolong armed conflict there.179  The
174. Id
175. See id. § 2776(e).
176. See id. § 2776(b).
177. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 211 (2d ed. 1988);
see also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION 124-25 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that in foreign affairs there is no such
thing as "excessive" delegation).
178. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
179. See id. at 311-12.
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the items exported, the quantity of each item, the contract price, the
name and address of the "ultimate user" of each item, and an esti-
mate of the number of United States government employees in the
territory to which the items will go.67
For any proposal to export defense articles or defense services
worth $50 million or more, the president must provide the above in-
formation to the Speaker of the House and the Chair of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee before the deal is completed or the li-
cense granted.1" The statute then specifies that Congress has a fif-
teen-day169 or thirty-day70 period in which to consider the proposed
export. During the specified period, Congress may request additional
information from the president including an estimate of the number
of United States military personnel or contract personnel needed to
carry out the proposed deal; an evaluation of whether and how the
proposed export would contribute to an arms race, support interna-
tional terrorism, increase the risk of an escalation or outbreak of
armed conflict, prejudice the negotiation of arms controls, or ad-
versely effect the arms control policy of the United States; the rea-
sons why the proposed export is in the foreign policy interests of the
United States; an analysis of the effect of the sale on the military ca-
pabilities of the buying country or organization; and an analysis of
how the proposed sale would effect the military balance of power in
the given region."' During the review period, Congress may act to
block the proposed export by joint resolution.' 2 If Congress does not
act within the given period, the president may issue the license at his
discretion.
The president may circumvent the specified waiting period by
stating in his certification that a state of emergency exists which re-
quires immediate approval of the exports.73 The emergency certifi-
cation must also set forth "a detailed justification for his determina-
tion, including a description of the emergency circumstances which
167. See id.
168. See id. § 2776(c)(1).
169. The fifteen-day period applies to exports to NATO, NATO members,
Australia, Japan, or New Zealand. See id. § 2776(c)(2)(A).
170. The thirty-day period applies to exports to any other country or organi-
zation. See id. § 2776(c)(2)(B).
171. See id § 2776(b)-(c).
172. See id. § 2776(c)(2)(A)-(B).
173. See id. § 2776(c)(2).
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defendants had sold machine guns to some of the combatants in vio-
lation of an arms embargo declared by the president."' They argued
that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to
the executive branch."' In a sweeping decision, Justice Sutherland
expounded on his view that the executive is the primary organ of
American foreign policy and that Congress can and should grant wide
discretion to the president in this area:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our
international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious
embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved.8
Critics have pointed out that the holding in Curtiss-Wright was rela-
tively narrow, characterizing much of Justice Sutherland's argument
as dicta. The decision, however, has remained very influential and is
an accurate statement of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area to
this day. '
Despite this jurisprudence, there is an argument that the Marque
and Reprisal Clause grants Congress a specific, exclusive power that
cannot be delegated without upsetting essential checks and balances
between the legislative and executive branches. Such an argument,
however, misses the point of the permissive delegation doctrine. The
overlapping and interlocking executive and congressional powers in
the realm of foreign relations are an inseparable blur.'" Picking out
any one foreign relations power and arguing that one or the other
branch has exclusive, non-delegable authority over it leads to illogical
results. Can it seriously be argued, for example, that the president
180. See id.
181. See id. at 314-15.
182. IL at 320.
183. See TRME, supra note 177, at 210-13.
184. See id; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (Jackson J., concurring). In his influential concurrence, Justice Jackson
described three "zones" of presidential action. The president acts against express
congressional provisions, with express congressional approval, or in the "twilight
zone" of congressional silence. When the president acts with congressional ap-
proval, his constitutional power is at its zenith. See icL at 637.
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can constitutionally send troops into battle without a formal declara-
tion of war, but he may not license private contractors to train a for-
eign army even when he has explicit congressional authority to do so?
The Constitution specifically grants Congress the power to regulate
privateering activity, but it also allows the delegation of a portion of
that authority to the executive.
The strongest limitation on any such delegation is in its imper-
manence.'8 Congress has decided for now to allow the president
broad discretion in regulating private military service exports, but
Congress can also decide tomorrow that it wants to limit that discre-
tion. For this reason, any delegation of a specific congressional
power only grants a portion of that power.
C. The Arms Export Control Act Fails to Effectively Regulate the
New Privateers in the Best Interests of the American People
The AECA is ineffective for three basic reasons. First, the
AECA no longer has any teeth to force presidential compliance.
Second, the AECA's reporting requirements provide inadequate in-
formation for Congress to assess private military service contracts.
Finally, the AECA provides only limited public information regard-
ing unclassified contracts which may commit the nation to acts of
war.
1. The AECA has no teeth
Congress enacted the 1976 Arms Export Control Act in response
to a series of controversial presidential arms sales to Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait.'" As originally enacted, the statute reserved in
Congress the power to reject large defense service contracts with a
concurrent resolution-a majority vote of both houses needing no
presidential approval."' Although Congress never exercised this veto
power, it imposed discipline on executive branch officials who admin-
istered AECA regulations."
From the 1930s through the 1970s, Congress enacted over 200
statutes allowing it to revoke certain executive actions by executive
185. See id. at 213.
186. See KOH, supra note 152, at 49-50.
187. See Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976). The 1976 act allowed concur-
rent resolution disapproval and the current act allows joint resolution disap-
proval for service contracts over $50 million. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2776(c)(2)(B)
(1997).
188. See KOH, supra note 152, at 50.
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agencies by "legislative veto. ' Depending on the statute, Congress
could employ the veto through a concurrent resolution, a one-house
majority vote, or a majority vote by a particular oversight commit-
tee."9
In INS v. Chadha,"' a case involving a congressional effort to
veto an INS suspension of deportation order, the Supreme Court
ruled that Article I of the Constitution requires any congressional
action that is legislative in character to be passed by both houses of
Congress and presented to the president for signature or veto.'92 Be-
cause it was legislative in character and not presented to the presi-
dent, the concurrent resolution legislative veto in Chadha was inva-
lid.1
93
In 1986, in response to the Chadha holding, Congress amended
the AECA, inserting "joint resolution" for "concurrent resolution.""
This change dramatically watered down Congress's ability to reject
military service contracts.195 Passing a joint resolution requires major-
ity approval in each house of Congress and presentment to the presi-
dent for signature or veto.1 96 Because the president clearly favors any
service contract at issue, Congress can only reject the contract by
overriding a presidential veto with a two-thirds vote. In other words,
the president can solicit a private military service contract as long as
he has the support of only one-third plus one in either house of Con-
gress.
This scenario has occurred at least twice in recent years with
controversial arms sales. In the mid 1980s, President Reagan ap-
proved arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that were opposed by
majorities in both houses of Congress. In each case, the president
was able to complete the arms sale by vetoing a joint resolution and
surviving an override attempt."9 Arms sales like these show that the
loss of the legislative veto provision has undermined Congress's dis-
ciplinary power under the AECA.
189. See TRiBE, supra note 177, at 213-14.
190. See id
191. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
192. See id. at 946-50.
193. See id. at 959.
194. See Pub. L. No. 99-247, 100 Stat. 9 (1986).
195. See Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & Representative Mel Levine, Letter,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1987, at A30.
196. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
197. See KOH, supra note 152, at 51; see also Biden & Levine, supra note 195.
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2. The AECA reporting provisions provide Congress with
inadequate information to assess private military service contracts
The primary problem with the AECA's reporting provisions is
that they require congressional review of military service contracts
only when a contract exceeds $50 million.19S With either service con-
tracts or arms sales, the type of military activity or the type of arms
authorized is often much more important than the dollar value. In
1987, Senator Joseph Biden proposed an amendment to the AECA
to discard dollar thresholds and substitute a well-defined list of types
of weapons systems requiring congressional review.'" In support of
the amendment, Senator Biden noted that the Reagan administration
had negotiated deals to sell extremely sophisticated anti-tank shells
to several Middle Eastern countries. He argued that because of their
advanced technology, these shells constituted a significant threat to
the balance of power in the region." Yet, the President did not need
congressional approval for the deals because none of them met the
dollar threshold."' Similarly, the nature of a private military service
contract is much more important than its dollar value. In unstable
regions where a truce or cease-fire is in place, even small-scale mili-
tary operations can destroy a delicate diplomatic balance. As
MPRI's project with the Croatian Army shows, a relatively small
training project can yield dramatic results.
Another major problem is that the AECA was drafted primarily
to regulate one-time arms sales contracts. As a result, the Act does
not provide adequate mechanisms for ongoing review of a service
contract that may last for months or years. For example, if MPRI did
violate the terms of its license and the United Nations arms embargo
in Croatia, it seems that there was little accountability for its actions
once the license was granted. Assurances that the company will fol-
low the rules are of little comfort when there is little or no oversight
or enforcement after the project has begun.
Often, the activities of a privateering company are closely inte-
grated with direct American military involvement in the same region,
and informal contacts between company employees and their active
duty counterparts abound.2 The Vinnell project in Saudi Arabia ex-
emplifies this type of situation. Close informal contacts between
198. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2776(c)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
199. See Biden & Levine, supra note 195.
200. See it
201. See id.
202. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 11.
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executive branch officials and private contractors, however, cannot
substitute for strict accountability to Congress. Critics charge that
congressional oversight is cursory at best:
If the D.O.D. [Department of Defense] was directly
involved you'd have a whole network of Congressional
offices providing oversight, even if it's not always sufficient.
... When you turn these tasks over to a contractor, the only
oversight comes from an overworked civil servant in the
federal bureaucracy.2
It is disconcerting that the regulations under the AECA provide no
ongoing oversight after an export license has been granted.
3. The AECA provides little public accountability for non-classified
contracts that may commit the entire nation to acts of war
There is very little public information about the activities of the
new privateers or the stringency with which the State Department
applies its licensing regulations. As mentioned above, the publishing
requirement for presidential certifications went into effect in 1996
and only applies to contracts for $50 million or more. Currently, the
information that is publicly available often depends on intensive in-
vestigative reporting by the press, but such efforts may bear little
fruit. As one reporter pointed out, the State Department licensing
process takes place far from public view:
The Pentagon is obliged to respond to inquiries, if not
always forthrightly, when U.S. troops are deployed abroad.
Retired generals and private companies have far more
leeway in evading questions from the press or Congress. A
former Congressional staffer who is familiar with the use of
private military contractors described the system as a
"nonsexy but far bigger Oliver North-style enterprise. '
This lack of public information makes it virtually impossible for the
public to assess the practice of private military contracting. Such lack
of public accountability would be less bothersome if the regulatory
203. Id. at 17.
204. Id. The Marque and Reprisal Clause may also be applicable to some of
the Iran-Contra activities because they involved presidential use of third-party
funding to avoid congressional restrictions on appropriations for the Contras.
Unlike the new privateers, however, most of the key players in Iran-Contra were
federal government employees not private actors. For an in-depth analysis of the
constitutional ramifications of Iran-Contra, see generally KOH, supra note 152.
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framework guaranteed adequate executive supervision and congres-
sional oversight. But the level of review and inquiry that either
branch gives to licensing decisions under the AECA is unclear.
The scarce public information that is available suggests that the
current regulatory scheme, while constitutional, does not provide the
same safeguards of ongoing executive review, in-depth congressional
oversight, and public accountability that are applied to ventures un-
dertaken by the United States military. Yet many of the same dan-
gers to American interests are involved when private contractors do
the work. Public accountability is perhaps the most important and
the most lacking safeguard, because without public accountability
there is no way for voters to evaluate the adequacy of congressional
enforcement provisions or oversight.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT NEW LEGISLATION TO
SPECIFICALLY REGULATE PRIVATE MILITARY SERVICE
CONTRACTORS AND ENSURE THAT THESE NEW PRIVATEERS
ALWAYS ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
In light of the executive's increasing reliance on private military
service contractors to perform national security functions, Congress
should address the specific issues their use raises through new legis-
lation under the Marque and Reprisal Clause of the Constitution. A
comprehensively-drafted sample bill is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but there are several provisions that effective legislation
should include.
Congress should re-enact the original legislative veto provision
of the 1976 AECA as applied to private military service contracts.
Despite the Chadha ruling, Congress and the president have enacted
literally hundreds of legislative veto provisions over the last fifteen
years.25 Although presidents have declared many new veto provi-
sions to have no force or effect, the effect of a veto provision on ad-
ministrative agencies is real. In essence, the Chadha decision has
driven legislative vetoes underground. "They [administrative agen-
cies] have to live with their [congressional] review committees year
after year, and have a much greater incentive to make accommoda-
tions and stick by them."2' Thus, informal agreements between con-
gressional committees and administrative agencies are the primary
205. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW &
CoNTrEmp. PROBs. 273, 288 (1993).
206. Id.
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method by which Congress remains directly involved in the adminis-
trative process.' Although a legislative veto over private military
service contracts would probably be held unconstitutional in the
courts under the Chadha decision, its passage would facilitate ne-
gotiations between Congress and the executive branch to arrive at in-
formal review procedures to give teeth to congressional oversight.
The new law should also clearly define private military service
contracting and base required review on the type of activity involved
not the value of the contract. Activities directly related to military
operations should receive the highest level of review regardless of the
size of the operation, whereas even large contracts for more tangen-
tial military projects should not. Under an effective statute, for ex-
ample, contracting to provide just a few officers for active duty in a
fledgling third world military would receive the highest level of con-
gressional scrutiny, but a $100 million contract to build barracks for a
foreign military would not.
Finally, the law should also require ongoing administrative re-
view of all contracts with quarterly reports to Congress. The reports
should assess the degree to which the contractor is complying with
the terms of the authorized contract. Each contractor should also be
required to post a bond insuring that the work stays within those
terms. Going beyond the terms should result in stiff fines commensu-
rate with the enormous profits reaped by private military service con-
tractors. The administrative reviews should be financed through li-
censing fees and fines. Congress should also publish all non-classified
207. See id. at 292.
208. Some commentators have argued that Chadha would not apply to a con-
gressional veto provision enacted pursuant to a special non-legislative power
granted to Congress by the Constitution. See Louis Fisher, War Powers: The
Need for Collective Judgment, in DIVIDED DEMOCRACY: COOPERATION AND
CoNFLICr BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESs 213-25 (J. Thurber ed.,
1991). For example, the concurrent resolution in the War Powers Act technically
may not be a legislative veto because the Act implements the congressional de-
clare war-power which is not a legislative power. Thus, a concurrent resolution
under the War Powers Act is simply a statement to the President that Congress
refuses to declare war, not a legislative act. See id.
One could argue by extension that a concurrent resolution veto power en-
acted pursuant to the Marque and Reprisal Clause is constitutional. The Chadha
Court, however, applied its ruling to any congressional action that is "essentially
legislative"--meaning that it "had the purpose and effect of altering legal rights,
duties and relations of persons ... outside the Legislative Branch." INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983). Using a concurrent resolution to reject a pri-
vate military service contract would alter the rights, duties, and relations of the
parties to the contract making the veto invalid under Chadha.
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information contained in its quarterly reports. Only then will the
electorate be able to make an informed decision about the value of
the new privateers.
The activities of MPRI and Vinnell show how private military
service contractors are potentially dangerous to the national security
interests of the American people. James Madison hoped that the
Marque and Reprisal Clause of the Constitution would ensure
"immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct
that nation is itself responsible."' The nation is responsible for the
actions of the new privateers because the United States government
solicits and authorizes their conduct. Currently, however, private
military service contractors are responsible only to the clients who
hire them and the executive branch bureaucrats who authorize their
contracts. Congress has power to regulate the new privateers under
the Marque and Reprisal Clause but has failed to exercise that power
effectively. Congress must enact new legislation to ensure that the
new privateers always act in the best interests of the American peo-
ple.
Matthew . Gaul*
209. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 318 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed.
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